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Abstract 
 
In this paper we analyze the time series of 12,000+ networks of traders in the e-mini 
S&P 500 stock index futures contract and empirically link network variables with 
financial variables more commonly used to describe market conditions. We show that 
network variables lead trading volume, intertrade duration, effective spreads, trade 
imbalances and other market liquidity measures. Network variables reflect 
information, information asymmetry and market liquidity and significantly presage 
future market conditions prior to volume or liquidity measures. We also find two-way 
Granger-causality between network variables and both returns and volatility, 
highlighting strong feedback between market conditions and trading behavior.  
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Financial markets bring buyers and sellers together, aggregating information for 
price discovery and providing liquidity for uninformed orders. Indeed, numerous 
models show that trading outcomes—prices, volume, volatility, and liquidity—
emerge from the complex mix of information flows and liquidity demands of 
individual buyers and sellers.1 More recent work directly connect network metrics to 
information flows (Babus and Kondor (2016)), dealer structure (Li and Schürhoff 
(2014)), order shredding/inventory management (Kyle, Obizhaeva, and Wang (2016)), 
and information percolation/market connectivity (Duffie, Malamud, and Manso 
(2015)).2 Each of these works serve to motivate an empirical examination of financial 
markets through the lens of network technology. 
In this paper we use established network analysis tools to characterize the 
time series dimensions of information and liquidity flows in the e-Mini S&P stock 
index futures market. We find strong and significant contemporaneous correlations 
between network statistics and financial variables, with network statistics 
significantly leading (Granger-causing) intertrade duration, trading volume, and 
other liquidity metrics. The fact that network statistics consistently lead these more 
traditional market metrics suggests that network statistics serve as primitive 
measures of market information and liquidity, lending support to the various 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1988), Foster and Viswanathan (1990, 1993, 1994). The theoretical literature on limit order markets includes 
Parlour (1998), Foucault (1999), Biais, Martimort and Rochet (2000), Parlour and Seppi (2003), Foucault, Kadan 
and Kandel (2005), Back and Baruch (2007), Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2005, 2009), Large (2009), Rosu (2009), 
and Biais and Weill (2009), among others. 
2 Other related works by DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003), Gale and Kariv (2003), Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, 
and Ozdaglar (2008), and Golub and Jackson (2010) explore learning in social networks (rather than the financial 
networks we study here). 
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theoretical models of information flows, trading strategies and information 
percolation in financial markets. Moreover, network statistics change prior to volume 
and duration changes, metrics which have been heretofore ascribed to capture 
information in financial markets.3 
We further explore whether measurement noise helps to explain the fact that 
network variables significantly lead more traditional market metrics. We find that, 
while the distributions of network statistics are largely unrelated to the noise-to-
signal ratio in the market, duration, effective spread and Herfindahl trade measures 
are all (at least marginally) affected by market noise. 
 Importantly, the e-Mini S&P stock index futures market matches buyers and 
sellers electronically and anonymously, with time-price priority. In this regard, our 
findings are not driven by personal, business, or other social ties more typically 
explored with network theory, but rather represent a clean test of spontaneous order 
theory, where markets exhibit order brought about by mutual adjustments to market 
prices (see Ferguson (1767) and Hayek (1948)).4 Moreover, this spontaneous order is 
consistent with models by Babus and Kondor (2016), Kyle et al. (2016), and Duffie et 
al. (2015) where information manifest in trading networks leads to changes in market 
information and liquidity. 
 Our findings also support models of information percolation in networks. For 
example, Golub and Jackson (2010) show that beliefs of network agents converge to 
                                                 
3 See Epps and Epps (1976) and Engle and Russell (1998). 
4 Ferguson (1787) notes that people “stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, 
but not the execution of any human design.” To describe this order Hayek (1948) coins the term catallaxy, meaning 
‘to admit in the community’ or ‘to make friends’ (notions familiar to social networks). 
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the truth if and only if the influence of the most central agents diminishes as the 
network grows. We show that a small group of market-makers extract mark-ups and 
deviations from the fundamental price are higher when the influence of the market-
makers is also higher. Likewise, Duffie et al. (2015) show that information percolates 
more effectively in markets with more transactions (higher volume) or in markets 
where traders are highly connected if duration is sufficiently large.  
While network analysis is data intensive, the fact that network statistics lead 
volume, duration and liquidity metrics suggests that there is value in monitoring 
network statistics from a regulatory and policy perspective. In Cohen-Cole, 
Patacchini and Zenou (2015) the propagation of incentives or strategic trading 
behavior in the interbank network generates systemic risk. Billio, Getmansky, Lo 
and Pelizzon (2012) and Brunetti, Harris, Mankad and Michailidis (2016) also use 
network analysis to identify and quantify financial crisis periods. 
We also document that network statistics capture complex feedback 
mechanisms in the time series with network variables exhibiting bi-directional 
Granger-causality with returns and volatility, suggesting that trading strategies 
evolve dynamically in response to changing market conditions. To highlight this 
dynamic, we simulate an agent-based trading model which replicates the 
contemporaneous correlations between financial and network variables, but exhibits 
no Granger-causality. Overall, we reject the null hypothesis of random trading 
patterns in transactions among market participants and support trading models 
motivated by information flows (Babus and Kondor (2016)), information percolation 
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(Duffie et al. (2015)), and trading strategies (Kyle et al. (2016)), which predict 
persistent trading patterns.  
Our results are robust to different equity index futures markets (e-mini Dow 
Jones and Nasdaq 100 futures), different observation periods (May and August 2008), 
and different network sampling frequencies (240 and 600 transactions). In the same 
E-mini S&P500 futures market that we study, Cohen-Cole, Kirilenko and Patacchini 
(2015) demonstrate how much a market shock is amplified by the network of traders 
and how widely it is transmitted across the network. They demonstrate that network 
pattern of trades captures the relations between behavior in the market and returns, 
showing that network spillovers explain as much as 90% of the individual variation 
in returns. 
Our study using the time-series properties of network statistics complements 
other recent work exploring networks in different settings. In addition to Billio et al. 
(2012) and Brunetti et al. (2016), Leitner (2005) and Babus (2009) model bank 
networks to explore contagion issues. Similarly, Allen and Gale (2000) and Upper 
(2006) highlight how common asset holdings can drive interconnectedness within 
bank networks. Braverman and Minca (2014) describe how common holdings can 
transmit financial distress in bank networks with the severity of contagion depending 
on both the level and liquidity of common holdings. Similarly, Lagunoff and Schreft 
(1998) develop a model which shows that a high level of interconnectedness may 
increase financial fragility. Cabrales and Gottardi (2014) note a trade-off between 
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risk-sharing and contagion within networks, while Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-
Salehi (2015) find that financial contagion is a function of the network structure.5 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1, we describe our unique high 
frequency data and our network and financial variables. In Section 2, we show 
examples of different trading networks and use these examples to illustrate how our 
network statistics relate to financial variables. In Section 3, we present 
contemporaneous correlations and lead-lag (Granger-causality) tests among network 
and financial variables. Section 4 explores the information content of trading 
networks. We conclude with Section 5. 
 
1. High Frequency Data, Network Metrics, and Financial Variables 
To build our trading networks, we use audit trail, transaction-level data for 
over 7.2 million regular transactions (executed between 9:30 a.m. ET and 4:00 p.m. 
ET) in the September 2009 e-mini S&P 500 futures contract during August 2009.6 
The e-mini S&P 500 futures contract is a highly liquid, fully electronic and cash-
settled. The data contain the date, time (up to the second), unique transaction 
identifier (which enables us to order transactions sequentially within each second), 
                                                 
5 See also De Vries (2005) and Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008). Roukny, Battiston, and Stiglitz (2016) show credit 
market networks can affect regulators’ capacity to assess systemic risk. Bank networks are also connected to 
systemic risk (see e,g, Elsinger, Lehar and Summer (2006), Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin (2005), Allen and Babus 
(2010) and Allen, Babus and Carletti (2012), Caccioli, Farmer, Foti and Rockmore (2013) and Roukny, Bersini, 
Pirotte, Caldarelli and Battiston (2013). 
6 We also replicate our results with trades in the e-mini Nasdaq 100 and e-mini Dow Jones stock index futures 
contracts and in e-mini S&P 500 futures data from May 2008, August 2008 and August 2009. For brevity, we 
report only August 2009 e-mini S&P 500 results. 
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executing and opposite trading accounts, and opposite brokers, buy/sell flag, price, 
and quantity;7 31,585 unique accounts trade during our August 2009 sample. 
Since our goal is to explore links between financial variables and network 
statistics, we first determine a sampling frequency that ensures our financial 
variables are not contaminated by market microstructure noise. We apply both the 
Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys (2000) volatility signature plot and Bandi 
and Russell (2006) technique and find that the smallest acceptable sampling window 
must contain at least 50 transactions. Cognizant that networks constructed over such 
a small number of transactions can be too sparsely connected to adequately capture 
the dynamic nature of the informational and liquidity forces that drive markets, we 
use 600 transactions to construct meaningful trading networks. 
1.1 Networks and Network Metrics 
Over the entire month of trading, we construct 12,032 sequential (non-
overlapping) trading networks, each comprised of 600 consecutive trades.8 Following 
network terminology, a network consists of nodes and edges. We define a node as an 
individual trader (trading account) and an edge that connects a pair of nodes as a 
trade between two traders. In our work the edges are directed, with buys representing 
edges pointed toward a trader and sells representing edges pointed away from a 
trader. Multiple transactions between traders are represented by a single directed 
edge pointed toward the buyer and away from the seller, even if the prices and 
                                                 
7 We applying standard filters designed to look for recording errors and outliers in the price and quantity series 
(see Hansen and Lunde (2006)) and find no irregularities in the data. 
8 Since the number of trades during the trading hours is seldom precisely divisible by 600, we complete the final 
network for each day with the trades reported after the close. Our results are robust to excluding this final 
network of each day. 
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quantities of each transaction differ. Additionally, from network terminology the 
degree of a node is the number of edges connected to it, with indegree (outdegree) 
representing the number of edges pointing toward (away from) the node. For clarity, 
we use the terms buydegree and selldegree to represent indegree and outdegree, 
respectively. 
Quantitative analysis of networks employs a set of standard metrics.  We focus 
on network metrics that represent the properties of information and liquidity in 
markets. Centrality, for instance, quantifies the importance of a specific trader in a 
network. Although several centrality measures exist, we use degree centrality to 
characterize how “central” a particular trader is in terms of its trading, utilizing the 
buy/sell indicators in our data to construct buydegree and selldegree centrality—
representing the number of bilateral purchases and sales, respectively, for each 
trader in the network.9 
We then compose aggregate centralization from individual trader centrality 
measures that characterizes the inequality in degree among all traders in the 
network. Specifically, we compute a centralization Gini (GB,S) for buyers (B) and 
sellers (S) defined as: 
GB,S =
∑ (2𝑟𝑖 − 𝑁 − 1)𝑘𝑖
𝑁
1
𝑁 ∗ 𝐸
 
                                                 
9 Note that buydegree and selldegree do not fully capture the role of a trader in the network.  For instance, a 
trader that does not execute a large number of trades but serves to connect otherwise disconnected traders may 
be very central, but will have relatively low buydegree and selldegree measures. 
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summing over all N traders, where ki is the ith trader's buydegree and selldegree, ri, 
i=1,…,N, is each trader's rank order number10 and E is the number of unique 
connections between traders present among the 600 trades in each network. By 
construction, GB and GS are 0 if every trader has the same number of buy and sell 
connections, and positive with increasing degree inequality. Maximum centralization 
occurs when one trader does all the buying or selling in the network.  
Using the above formula, we compute network-wide centralization as the 
difference between GB and GS. Intuitively, centralization can be interpreted as the 
presence of a dominant buyer (close to 1) or a dominant seller (close to -1) within the 
600-trade network. The absolute value of centralization (|centralization|) therefore 
represents the presence of a dominant trader on either side of the market. In 
economic terms, centralization is a measure of informed trading or strong net demand 
for liquidity in the market. 11 
Assortativity in networks represents the tendency of “like to be connected with 
like” for any node (Newman (2002)). For our purposes, we use each trader's buydegree 
and selldegree to assess assortativity within our networks, examining the propensity 
of highly connected buyers to trade with highly connected sellers, for instance. In an 
assortative network, buyers/sellers with many edges (high buydegree/selldegree 
                                                 
10 The trader with the highest centrality ranks highest, the trader with the second highest centrality ranks second, 
and so on. We rank buydegree and selldegree centrality separately. 
11 Table A-I in the (online) appendix presents summary statistics for the network variables across all 12,032 
networks in our sample. Each network variable is stationary and exhibit persistent autocorrelations. Jarque-Bera 
(1980) tests reject the null of normality at standard significance levels. Centralization is approximately symmetric 
and ranges from -0.74 to +0.65 with a mean near zero and standard deviation of 0.17. |Centralization| ranges 
from 0.0 to 0.74 with mean 0.14 and standard deviation of 0.10. The mass of this distribution is more than one 
standard deviation away from zero, which can be interpreted as inequality in the number of buy versus sell 
matches per trader. 
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nodes) are more likely to connect to similar buyers/sellers. In a disassortative 
network, buyers/sellers with many edges tend to connect to buyers/sellers with few 
edges. In real markets, block trades between two large traders represent 
disassortative networks, while large orders “walking the book” against many small 
counterparties represents assortative networks. As in Golosov, Lorenzoni and 
Tsyvinski (2009), small uninformed traders seeking to elicit information about asset 
values by making small offers may encounter large, informed traders (generating 
assortativity) or other small traders (generating a disassortative market). 
We measure assortativity by the Pearson correlations between buydegree and 
selldegree for all edges present in the network. Using the notation above, over all 
edges Ei.j we calculate four pairwise correlations ρ(kibuy, kjbuy), ρ(kibuy, kjsell), ρ(kisell, 
kjbuy), and ρ(kisell, kjsell) corresponding to the four conditional degree distributions 
(buydegree ki,jbuy and selldegree ki,jsell) for each connected trader pair i and j. 
Intuitively, the coefficient ρ(kisell, kjbuy) measures the correlation between the number 
of unique buyers to whom a seller is selling to and the number of unique sellers that 
those buyers are buying from. A negative correlation indicates that when a seller 
matches with many buyers, those buyers are buying from few or no other sellers. 
From these four correlations, we construct an aggregate assortativity index 
(AI) for each network 
𝐴𝐼 =
1
4
(𝜌(𝑘𝑖
𝑏𝑢𝑦 , 𝑘𝑗
𝑏𝑢𝑦) −  𝜌(𝑘𝑖
𝑏𝑢𝑦, 𝑘𝑗
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙) − 𝜌(𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 , 𝑘𝑗
𝑏𝑢𝑦) +  𝜌(𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 , 𝑘𝑗
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙)) 
computed over all edges, where the scaling factor, ¼, assures that the assortativity 
index falls between -1 and 1. By construction, the assortativity index captures 
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patterns in networks that feature large degree dispersion. For example, the 
assortativity index is high in a network that contains dominant traders or 
intermediaries—in either case, trades occur between parties that differ in both 
connectivity and liquidity provision/removal. 
Intuitively, assortativity represents a measure of asymmetric information or 
liquidity imbalance in a trading network.12 For instance, one large buyer matched 
with a number of small sellers exhibits high assortativity while a large buyer matched 
with a single large seller exhibits low assortativity. Indeed, if large orders are “shred” 
into smaller trades (perhaps stemming from inventory concerns as in Kyle et al. 
(2016)), assortativity will be high. Likewise, the presence of informed traders who 
have a greater number of counterparties will increase assortativity as in Babus and 
Kondor (2016).13 
Clustering is a measure of transitivity in the network, i.e. if i trades with j, and 
j trades with k, clustering measures whether i also trades directly with k. We quantify 
clustering using the global clustering coefficient (CC) (Newman (2002)): 
𝐶𝐶 =
3 ∗ 𝑇𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑
𝑇
 
                                                 
12 Glosten (1987), Stoll (1989), George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991) and Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans 
(1997) each model asymmetric information components in quoted bid-ask spreads.  
13 Table A-I in the (online) appendix shows that the assortativity index in our sample ranges from -0.06 to +0.34, 
with a mean of 0.04 and standard deviation of 0.04.  This positive mean stems in part from the skewed degree 
distributions. Most buyers have low buydegree and, on average, buy from a seller with high selldegree. Similarly, 
most sellers have low selldegree and, on average, sell to buyers with high buydegree. This pattern is consistent 
with a market populated by a small number of highly connected intermediaries who trade with many liquidity-
demanding (or informed) traders. 
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where T represents the total number of “connected triples” of three traders (i, j and 
k) and Tclosed represents the number of “closed triples” where i trades with j, j trades 
with k, and i also trades directly with k.14 
Economically, the clustering coefficient represents liquidity in the market. 
Connected triples represent the presence of at least one short-term liquidity provider. 
Intuitively, large clustering coefficients represent greater liquidity. In the extreme 
case where a single trader provides liquidity, no closed triples exist and the clustering 
coefficient is zero. At the other extreme, where all triples involve three traders 
connected as a “closed triple”, the clustering coefficient is 3. Higher clustering levels 
(connectivity) are also linked to higher levels of information in Duffie et al. (2015).15  
Dispersion of information or liquidity in the market may be measured using 
connected components. A connected component is the set of all traders connected with 
each other through bilateral trading. The largest strongly connected component 
(LSCC) is the maximum number of traders that can be reached from any other trader 
by following directed edges.  
We compute the largest strongly connected component as: 
𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶 =
𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑁
 
                                                 
14 We treat the edges as undirected in the clustering coefficient since intermediation/liquidity involves both buying 
and selling. Fagiolo (2007) discusses directed clustering coefficients. 
15 As shown in Table A-I, the clustering coefficient ranges from 0.0 to 0.23, with an average of 0.05 and standard 
deviation of 0.03. On average, there is only a slight tendency for traders to cluster in this market. Indeed, the 
average clustering coefficient we observe is nearly identical to the coefficient we would expect by randomly 
connecting traders. 
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where LSCCMax is the raw count of traders in the LSCC and N is the total number of 
traders in the market. This ratio ranges between 1/N (one trader connects all other 
traders) and 1 (all traders are connected to all other traders). 
A larger LSCC forms when many traders are both buying and selling, that is 
when the supply of liquidity is dispersed among many traders. For example, a large 
strongly connected component is likely to emerge as a result of a large number of limit 
orders rather than one large market order. Since the LSCC is scaled by the total 
number of traders in the market, the arrival of concentrated net demand for liquidity 
will manifest itself in a smaller LSCC. Similar to clustering, a larger LSCC indicates 
greater connectivity, which is linked to higher levels of information in Duffie et al. 
(2015). Golosov et al. (2009) focus on the time-dimension of information diffusion 
either between differentially informed agents, or from homogeneously informed to 
uninformed agents.16  
1.2  Financial Variables 
For each of the 12,032 network sampling periods, we also compute market 
returns, volatility, intertrade duration, trading volume, and more standard liquidity 
measures including effective bid-ask spreads, and signed volume, buy/sell trade 
imbalances. These variables typically describe financial market conditions. Lastly, 
given that clustering and centralization may be related to market concentration, we 
                                                 
16 As Table A-I in the (online) appendix indicates, the portion of the network occupied by the largest strongly 
connected component varies significantly, ranging from 0.00 to 0.52, with a mean of 0.09 and standard deviation 
of 0.06. While both clustering and LSCC represent liquidity/market information, the mean and variability in 
LSCC are significantly larger, suggesting that the two metrics are not equivalent. 
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also construct a Herfindahl measure of buy/sell trade concentration during each 
interval.17 
Market returns contain valuable information about the true underlying price 
formation process, but may also contain market microstructure noise, measurement 
errors, and seasonal patterns (Engle (2000)). We compute open-to-close market 
returns as the log difference between the last and the first transaction price for each 
network period. We remove the predictable intraday seasonal component from raw 
returns by regressing returns on a constant and a sequence of dummy variables for 
each half-hour during the trading day and use the unexplained term as our measure 
of market returns.18 
We use three measures to estimate volatility during each sampling interval 
period: absolute returns, squared returns, and the log difference between the 
maximum and minimum prices (price range). For the results reported below, we use 
price range as an estimate of volatility. Importantly, however, our main results are 
not affected by the choice of volatility estimator. 19  
Trading volume contains valuable information about the underlying price 
formation process, because volume together with observed transaction prices may be 
                                                 
17 Table A-II in the (online) appendix presents summary statistics for the financial variables across all 12,032 
networks in our sample. As with our network variables, all financial variables in our sample are stationary and 
(other than returns) highly persistent, with significant autocorrelation coefficients at 1, 5, and 10 lags.  
18 We apply the same technique and use a Fourier flexible form to remove seasonality from all variables and 
examine alternative close-to-close returns with similar results. 
19 Range-based volatility estimators are more efficient than return-based volatility estimators (see, e.g., Parkinson 
(1980), Garman and Klass (1980), Beckers (1983), and Brunetti and Lildtholdt (2006)). Christensen and Podolskij 
(2007) use the price range to compute realized volatility in high frequency data. As shown in Table A-II in the 
(online appendix), across 12,032 sampling intervals, volatility averages about 0.06 percent, corresponding to an 
annual volatility of 23.56 percent. Volatility ranges from 0.02 to 0.29 percent, with a standard deviation of just 
0.02 percent. 
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driven by a common latent factor.20 We compute trading volume as the number of 
contracts both bought and sold during each network interval. 
Intertrade duration can be interpreted as a proxy for the arrival of new 
information or liquidity to the market (Engle and Russell (1998) and Engle (2000)). 
While the concept of duration in Duffie et al. (2015) differs somewhat from intertrade 
duration, they show that markets with more transactions (or with greater 
connectivity) have higher information if duration is sufficiently low. We compute 
three measures of duration (total period duration, volume-weighted period duration, 
and the average of the 599 durations) and report results for total period duration—
the time elapsed during the network interval. Our main results are not affected by 
the choice of duration estimator.21  
Liquidity reflects the ease with which a security can be bought or sold without 
a significant price change. Unlike trading volume and duration, liquidity is not 
directly observable and has multiple dimensions. Indeed, our network variables 
capture some of these dimensions. We also compute more traditional liquidity 
metrics, like effective spreads, signed volume and trade imbalances.22 The effective 
spread captures the implied cost of trading and is equal to twice the square root of 
the first order autocovariance of returns over each interval (Stoll (1978)). Signed 
                                                 
20 The vast literature on the properties of trading volume includes Clark (1973), Epps and Epps (1976), Tauchen 
and Pitts (1983), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Easley and O'Hara (1992), and Andersen (1996), among others. 
21 As shown in Table A-II, duration ranges from zero to 344 seconds with 600 transactions occurring every 40.8 
seconds, on average. 
22 We also compute Amihud illiquidity measures using both contract volume and dollar trading volume with 
nearly identical results. 
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volume (buy minus sell volume) and trade imbalances (number of buys minus sells) 
capture the propensity for buy and sell orders to match up during the interval. 
The e-mini S&P 500 contract is extremely liquid.23  The raw Amihud illiquidity 
measure (unreported) also has mean, median, and standard deviation very close to 
zero and indicates it takes about 21 contracts (or over $1 million) to move prices by 
one tick (0.25 index points). While mean and median signed volume and trade 
imbalances are very small, the market can be imbalanced, with maximum signed 
volume exceeding 5000 contracts and maximum buy imbalance at 13 trades. These 
extreme cases suggest that market liquidity can be stressed during the short 
intervals we study.24 
 
2. Illustrative Examples 
Prior to conducting the time-series statistical analysis for the network and 
financial variables, we present statistics from representative trading networks to 
illustrate the key concepts and the intuition behind our approach. Figure 1 presents 
three actual trading networks from our data, accompanied by network statistics and 
financial variables. The three trading networks are chosen to display relatively high 
values of centralization (left column), assortativity (middle column), and both 
clustering and the largest strongly connected component (right column). 
                                                 
23 Table A-II in the (online) appendix shows that the average effective spread is less than 0.8 cents, with a 
maximum effective spread of just over two cents during our sample period. 
24 Table A-II also displays a Herfindahl measure computed over each trading interval to compare with the 
clustering and centralization metrics we apply from network statistics. The Herfindahl trades statistic is less 
variable than most other variables, with a minimum of 0.0002, maximum of 0.0013 and standard deviation of just 
0.0001. In unreported results we also construct a Herfindahl volume metric with nearly identical results.  
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The left column of Figure 1 presents a network with one dominant seller 
(perhaps an informed trader or trader with strong liquidity demand) matched with 
many small buyers. As shown in Panel A, this trading network has a large negative 
centralization coefficient, intermediate levels of assortativity and LSCC, and a small 
clustering coefficient. As shown in Panel B, this network is also associated with a 
large negative market return, high volatility, intermediate trading volume, and low 
duration. Liquidity, volatility, duration and return statistics suggest that strong 
liquidity demand drains a significant portion of market liquidity and made a 
considerable price impact. Indeed, the signed volume and trade imbalance are 
accompanied by a large negative return, volatility, and short intertrade duration 
suggesting a large market order which quickly “walks the book.” 
The center column of Figure 1 presents a trading network with a relatively 
large buyer trading with several moderately-sized sellers through a number of 
intermediaries. As shown in Panel A, this network is characterized by intermediate 
centralization and clustering levels, suggesting that the net demand for liquidity is 
relatively balanced, with slightly negative signed volume but positive trade 
imbalance. Moreover, high assortativity means that large traders are mostly matched 
with many small traders (rather than with each other); and the small LSCC suggests 
that just a few intermediaries provide liquidity. As shown in Panel B, this network is 
associated with good liquidity and relatively low effective spreads. Furthermore, this 
network is characterized by high duration and relatively low volume—these 600 
trades are relatively small. This network is associated with intermediate positive 
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market returns and volatility. Overall, these market conditions represent a handful 
of intermediaries supplying liquidity to smaller traders. 
The right column of Figure 1 presents a trading network with greater 
dispersion among buyers and sellers of various sizes, reflected in zero centralization 
(no dominant buyer or seller) and low assortativity (like traders trade with like). High 
levels of clustering and LSCC, suggest that the net supply of liquidity is dispersed 
among many traders. Indeed, this trading network exhibits zero returns accompanied 
by good liquidity—low signed volume imbalance, zero trade imbalance and relatively 
large trading volume. 
These three examples illustrate our conjecture that network statistics and 
standard financial variables capture different dimensions of market conditions. 
Indeed, since information and liquidity appear to drive both network and financial 
variables, the two sets of variables are likely to be statistically interrelated as well. 
We formally examine the statistical relation between network metrics and traditional 
financial variables below. 
 
3. The Statistical Relation between Network and Financial Variables 
We first examine contemporaneous correlations among network and financial 
variables and then test for lead-lag relations between and among these variables. 
Panel A in Table I reports contemporaneous correlations among network variables. 
Although centralization is not correlated with other network variables, the other 
network variables are often strongly correlated with each other. |Centralization| is 
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negatively correlated with both the clustering coefficient and the LSCC. That is, when 
a dominant trader increases net demand for market liquidity, counterparties to that 
dominant trader are less likely to trade with each other. Conversely, the high positive 
correlation between clustering and LSCC suggests that dispersed net liquidity supply 
among many traders is often accompanied by strong liquidity demand. Assortativity 
is relatively uncorrelated with centralization and clustering, but is strongly 
negatively correlated with the LSCC—both higher assortativity and lower LSCC 
reflect greater liquidity imbalances.  
Panel B in Table I examines this economic intuition more closely with 
contemporaneous correlations between financial and network variables. 
Centralization is strongly correlated with returns, signed volume and trade 
imbalances. While |centralization| is positively correlated with volume and 
volatility, it is negatively correlated with duration, effective spreads and trade 
concentration. Intuitively, a large order (with high |centralization|) that walks the 
limit order book results in higher volatility and volume with lower duration. 
Higher asymmetric information or greater liquidity imbalance, as represented 
by assortativity, is negatively correlated with volume and volatility, but largely 
unrelated to more traditional market metrics. The former suggests that higher 
asymmetric information or liquidity imbalance is accompanied by a reduction in both 
volatility and trading volume. The latter suggests that asymmetric information, as 
represented by assortativity, is not related to signed volume or trade imbalances. 
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Clustering is positively correlated with volume and negatively correlated with 
effective spreads and volatility. Intuitively, since clustering captures short-term 
market making activities, greater intermediation improves liquidity, smooths 
volatility and enhances trading volume. Clustering is also highly negatively 
correlated with trade concentration (Herfindahl trades). The LSCC, the dispersion of 
net liquidity supply, is positively correlated with both volume and volatility. The 
LSCC, however, is not significantly correlated with other more traditional financial 
market variables.  
While the contemporaneous correlations suggest a link between network and 
financial variables, we now examine whether this link reflects a redundancy in the 
data or whether network variables add incremental value to more traditional market 
quality metrics. We use the time series of data to examine the lead-lag relations 
among network and financial variables and conjecture that network metrics serve as 
primitive measures of information and liquidity.  
We apply standard Granger causality tests in vector autoregressive (VAR) 
models among network and financial variables.25 Table II provides the p-values of 
Granger-non-causality tests among the five network variables. Centralization 
neither Granger-causes nor is Granger-caused by other network variables (p-values 
equal to 0.65 and 0.37, respectively). As a system, however, the remaining network 
variables are both jointly Granger-caused by (and jointly Granger-cause) each other 
                                                 
25 Since the variables exhibit heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, we estimate VAR models using generalized 
method of moments (GMM) and Newey-West robust standard errors. Standard tests show that the VAR model 
must include all five network variables. The Akaike and Schwartz Information Criteria indicate an optimal lag-
length of twelve. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
20 
 
(p-values between 0.00 and 0.05), indicating strong feedback effects within our 
network statistics. Indeed, most pair-wise tests are also significant. 
Table III presents p-values for the Granger-non-causality tests between 
network variables and each financial variable both jointly and independently. In 
Panel A, we find that returns and volatility are jointly both Granger-caused by and 
Granger-cause network variables (p-values of 0.00 and 0.01 for returns and 0.00 and 
0.00 for volatility, respectively). Centralization drives the result for returns, with 
strong bi-directional Granger-causality. For volatility, we find strong bi-directional 
Granger-causality (feedback effects) between volatility and each network variable. 
Panel B in Table III reports test results for intertrade duration and volume. 
We find strong evidence of one-way causality—duration and volume are both 
Granger-caused by each network variable, both individually and jointly (joint p-value 
= 0.00). While duration leads the LSCC and volume leads assortativity, neither 
duration nor volume lead network variables jointly (p-values = 0.20 and 0.16, 
respectively). These results indicate that network statistics significantly lead both 
duration and trading volume. To the extent that duration and volume proxy for 
information arrival, network statistics reflect forthcoming changes in market 
conditions. 
Lastly, Panels C and D show that network variables jointly Granger-cause 
signed volume, trade concentration, effective spreads and trade imbalances. These 
strong results suggest that the demand and supply of liquidity are reflected in 
network variables prior to emerging in more traditional liquidity measures. While 
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individual pair-wise tests vary significantly, we find no feedback effects here. Taken 
as a whole, these network statistics lead short-term changes in both liquidity and 
market concentration as well.26 
 
4. Information, Noise and Network Formation 
4.1 Information 
For greater perspective on real world trading networks, we examine the time 
series properties in both re-wired networks and simulated networks. We first re-wire 
our networks using each active trader while preserving the degree distribution: e.g. 
if trader i in a given network sells (buys) three times, in the re-wired network node i 
still sells (buys) three times but to randomly assigned counterparties in the same 
network. We re-compute all the network variables in the re-wired networks to 
compare with the actual trading networks. If the trading networks are randomly 
formed, there will be no difference between the trading and re-wired networks. 
In contrast to the high correlations found between trading network variables 
and financial variables, we find almost no correlations with statistics generated from 
re-wired networks.27 Moreover, the results from the Granger-non-causality tests do 
not hold for the re-wired network. These findings support the notion that the trading 
                                                 
26 For comparison, Table A-III in the (online) appendix displays bi-variate VAR Granger-causality tests between 
traditional liquidity metrics and the traditional market statistics of returns, volatility, volume and duration.  
Contrary to the tests with network statistics, we find bi-directional causality among many of these variables—
they are jointly determined contemporaneously. Effective spreads, in particular, exhibit bi-directional relations 
with volatility, volume and duration. Trade imbalances (Panel B) are unrelated to these other market statistics. 
Interestingly, we find no leads or lags between these traditional liquidity measures and returns, in stark contrast 
to the strong bi-directional effects between network statistics and returns. These results confirm that network 
metrics capture market conditions that are not reflected in traditional market descriptors. In fact, network 
metrics significantly presage future market conditions at very short horizons. 
27 To conserve space, we do not report the results. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
22 
 
networks do not form randomly, but rather reflect information flows and/or 
information percolation. 
Secondly, we explore the source of the bi-directional Granger-causality that we 
find between network and financial variables by constructing an agent-based 
simulation model of a limit order market that is devoid of a feedback mechanism. The 
simulated networks allow for heterogeneous beliefs about the price process, but 
impart no intentionality or memory upon the traders. Consequently, we might expect 
to find significant correlations among network and financial variables, but not 
necessarily evidence of Granger-causality since feedback effects are not included.28 
Generally, we find that the simulated executions generate contemporaneous 
correlations similar to, but less significant than, those from real market data. The 
correlations between network variables and between network and financial variables 
are displayed in Table IV. As with the market data, we find strong correlations 
between returns and centralization. The simulation also sheds light on the possible 
sources of this high correlation. We find that the mechanics of the impatient order 
submission strategy raises the correlation: when a large buy order at a high price is 
matched against several existing sell orders network centralization is high. Matching 
a large number of sell orders to a single buy order likely reflects the large buy order 
walking up the book, so contemporaneous returns are also high. 
Generally, correlations between volatility and |centralization|, and between 
the Hefindhal index and |centralization| are also relatively high in the simulated 
                                                 
28 Details on the simulation are included in the Appendix 
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networks. These results suggest that the order matching process can generate 
contemporaneous correlations between financial and network variables in the 
absence of any economic motivation (other than the prescribed urgency to trade built 
in to simulate perishable information). 
Granger-causality tests among simulated variables lack the dynamic structure 
found in live market data, as might be expected.29 Indeed, Granger-causality tests 
among network and financial variables are generally insignificant and yield few 
feedback effects, indicating a very poor fit. This suggests that the Granger-causality 
results that we find in the actual market data arise as a result of the strategic 
behavior of traders (as in Cohen-Cole et al. (2015)) or information flows or percolation 
(as in Babus and Kondor (2016) and Duffie et al. (2015)) and are not simply artifacts 
of the order matching process. 
4.2 Noise 
We also explore whether measurement error (known to affect returns) affects 
our inferences about network statistics.30 Both financial and network variables may 
be noisy estimates of other latent variables in the market. We conjecture that 
networks measure information and market interactions among agents with less error 
than traditional financial statistics. Borrowing from the high frequency econometrics 
literature31 we may write the observed (log) trading price as 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡
𝐹 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
                                                 
29 Reflecting the lack of dynamics in the simulated data, the AIC (SIC) selects an optimal lag-length of order one 
(zero) in the VAR specification. We use lag-length of order one. 
30 We thank an anonymous referee for moving the paper in this direction. 
31 See Andersen et al. (2000), Barndorff-Nielsen, Hansen, Lunde and Shephard (2009), and Zhang, Mykland and 
Ait-Sahalia (2005). 
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where 𝑝𝑡
𝐹 is the fundamental (true) price and 𝜀𝑡 represents the market microstructure 
noise stemming from bid-ask bounce, discrete prices, etc. The effects of noise on 
observed prices depends on the properties of the noise itself. In particular, if we 
compute returns as  
∆𝑝𝑡 = ∆𝑝𝑡
𝐹 + ∆𝜀𝑡 
and if 𝜀𝑡 is autocorrelated and also correlated to 𝑝𝑡
𝐹 then ∆𝑝𝑡 is a moving average 
process and the effects of the error term can be substantial. While we select the 
optimal sampling frequency to minimize the effects of the error when computing daily 
realized volatilities, other financial variables might also be affected by noise. 
Conversely, our network variables utilize only the direction of trades and do not 
include information about prices and/or quantities, so we hypothesize that network 
variables are less affected by microstructure noise, 𝜀𝑡. 
To test this hypothesis, we first compute the ratio of high-low (range) volatility 
estimates to open-to-close returns as a simple measure of the noise-to-signal ratio in 
the market. For instance, if a network interval has a large bid-offer spread (large 
value of 𝜀𝑡) and the fundamental price (𝑝𝑡
𝐹) does not change much, the range mainly 
captures noise. Additionally, information that moves the price captures the signal, 
represented in the denominator, and the ratio of the range to the open-to-close return 
is a proxy for the noise-to-signal ratio (at least for the extreme cases—i.e. when large 
values of the range are associated with low returns). In fact, we concentrate on the 
right tail of the distribution of our proxy of the noise-to-signal ratio. 
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Figure 2 depicts the noise-to-signal ratios for the top decile of our network 
intervals. As shown, 60 intervals (representing 0.5% of the total) contain the largest 
noise-to-signal ratios, with the ratio stabilizing around the 400th observation (3% of 
our sample). In the analysis that follows we consider both the 97th percentile and the 
95th percentile of the noise to signal ratio. 
Figure 3 depicts the distribution of the network statistics, segmenting 
networks in the 95th percentile by noise-to-signal ratio from all others. The 
observations that correspond to top quintile of the noise-to-signal ratio are in red, 
while all other observations are in green.32 Figure 3 shows that there is no material 
difference between the network variables corresponding to the top quintile of the 
noise-to-signal ratio and all other observations. Moreover, the tails of these 
distributions of network statistics appear to be more populated by observations not 
related to high noise-to-signal ratios.   
In Table V we present formal tests of whether the means of the network 
variables corresponding to the top quintile of the noise-to-signal ratio and the mean 
of the rest of the observations are equal. These tests clearly fail to reject the null of 
different population means—when the signal-to-noise ratio is high, network variables 
are not materially different. 
We run the same test for the financial variables and marginally reject (at 10% 
level) the null of equal means for volume, duration, effective spread and Herfindahl 
trades when comparing the top quintile of the noise-to-signal ratio to the rest of the 
                                                 
32 Results are similar for the 97th percentile. 
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sample.33 These results provide some evidence in support of our hypothesis that 
network variables contain less noise than financial variables. 
4.3 Network Formation 
Given that patterns emerge in network statistics, we also formally test the 
mark-up hypothesis of Li and Schürhoff (2014)—that more central traders can 
estimate their own contemporaneous influence in the market and can then use this 
advantage to more accurately predict future market returns. To do so we first isolate 
the top seven traders (by trading volume) and compute the following over each 
network interval. Let 𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 be the quantity transacted between accounts 𝑖 and 𝑗 in 
period 𝑡. Then, 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑠𝑡 = ∑ 𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑖𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝑜𝑝7, 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑡 = ∑ 𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑖𝑗 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑇𝑜𝑝7, and 𝑘𝑡 = 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑠𝑡 −
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑡 and 𝑘𝑡 is a centrality measure for the top seven traders, analogous to centrality 
computed across all traders individually. We then run the following regression: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗
3
𝑗=0
𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾0 + ℎ0 + 𝑚0 + 𝑠0 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝛾0, ℎ0, 𝑚0, 𝑠0 are the day of the week, hour, minute, and second fixed effects. 
The mark-up hypothesis implies that central traders make markets so that 𝛽1 < 0, 
and learn from this central position and can forecast future returns, so that 𝛽2 > 0 
and 𝛽3 > 0. 
The first column in Table VI shows that contemporaneous returns are 
negatively related to more central traders (𝑘𝑡) suggesting these traders serve an 
informal market making role. Moreover, returns also contain information from more 
                                                 
33 Note we do not run the test for volatility and returns since both measures are used in constructing our noise-
to-signal ratios. 
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central traders at up to two lags. The second column in Table VI shows that lagged 
returns are strongly positively related to more central traders for at least three lags. 
These results are consistent with the mark-up hypothesis of Li and Schürhoff (2014). 
 
5. Conclusions 
We use audit trail data that identifies trading accounts on both sides of every 
trade to construct the links between buyers and sellers in the e-mini S&P 500 stock 
index futures contract, the price discovery venue for the U.S. equity market. We 
construct a time series of more than 12,000 trading networks each comprised of 600 
sequential trades and use established network analysis tools to empirically link 
network variables with financial variables that describe market conditions. We find 
that network statistics are contemporaneously correlated with these financial 
variables, suggesting that the underlying economics that drive financial variables 
also drive network parameters. Importantly, network variables capture information, 
information asymmetry and liquidity characteristics in the e-mini S&P500 futures 
market that we study consistent with models of information flows or percolation (e.g. 
Babus and Kondor (2016) and Duffie et al. (2015)) 
Moreover, network variables are primitive determinants of market conditions, 
emerging prior to more common measures of information and liquidity, due in part to 
the fact that network variables are less contaminated by market noise. For example, 
we find that network statistics Granger-cause trading volume, intertrade duration, 
effective spreads, trade imbalances and signed volume imbalances. We also document 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
28 
 
bi-directional Granger-causality between network variables and both returns and 
volatility, suggesting that network variables also capture complex feedback 
mechanisms that underlie trading strategies in financial markets. 
We conjecture that market-wide patterns of order execution are informative 
about the price formation process in order driven markets and these dynamics are 
manifest in both financial and network variables. Given the fact that network 
variables presage volume, duration and other market liquidity measures, we conclude 
that trading network analysis offers a fruitful mechanism for assessing trading 
strategies that drive price formation and liquidity supply in financial markets (as in 
Cohen-Cole et al. (2015) and Kyle et al. (2016)). 
Indeed, we form our trading networks based on common trader attributes—a 
buyer and a seller agree on a precise price and quantity at a given time and therefore 
trade. Like Billio et al. (2012), we show that networks formed not on the basis of 
personal relationships, but rather on economic considerations, reflect market 
conditions prior to more traditional volume and volatility metrics. Moreover, we find 
support for the mark-up hypothesis of Li and Schürhoff (2014)—that more central 
traders can use their information advantage to predict short horizon market returns. 
Given the strong contemporaneous link between financial and network 
variables, we believe that network analysis tools also offer new insights into the 
behavior of financial markets. We adopt confidential data. However, financial 
networks can be formed by public data as shown in Billio et al. (2012), Diebold and 
Yilmaz (2014) and Brunetti et al. (2016). 
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While the data we employ here differs from the typical social network setting 
where connections are personal, we show that networks formed by economic 
connections also reveal information about market conditions, despite the lack of social 
connections between our traders. Whether our results hold in settings where orders 
are executed via preferencing arrangements, across competitive trade execution 
venues (like the U.S. equity markets), in floor-based exchanges, or in markets where 
internalization or payments/rebates for order flow are possible remain questions for 
further research. 
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Panel A: Network Metrics 
Centralization -0.736 0.044 0.000 
|Centralization| 0.736 0.044 0.000 
Assortativity 0.097 0.297 0.011 
Clustering 0.003 0.009 0.170 
LSCC 0.013 0.005 0.333 
Panel B: Traditional Financial Variables 
Returns -0.100 0.051 0.000 
Volatility 0.100 0.051 0.051 
Volume 2325 2304 3832 
Duration 10 19 14 
Effective Spread 0.007 0.005 0.009 
Signed Volume -2151 -557 -170 
Trade Imbalance -4.0 2.0 0.0 
Herfindahl Trades 7.50 7.94 9.56 
Figure 1. Trading Network Statistics This figure displays three examples of trading networks comprised of 600 sequential 
trades in the nearby e-mini S&P 500 futures contract on the CME Globex platform during August 2009. Centralization, 
|Centralization|, assortativity, clustering and the largest strongly connected component (LSCC) are computed as defined in 
Section I. Returns are open-to-close returns computed as differences between log ending and beginning prices during each 
interval. Volatility is the range between high and low prices, volume is the total number of contracts traded and duration is the 
time (in seconds) elapsed between the start and end of the network interval. Effective Spread is equal to twice the square root 
of the first order autocovariance of returns over each interval (x10-3). Signed Volume is equal to the buy volume minus the sell 
volume. Trade Imbalance is equal to the number of buy trades less the number of sell trades in each interval. Herfindahl 
Trades is the Herfindahl index computed using the number of trades traded by each trader over each interval (x10-3). A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
37 
 
 
Figure 2: Noise-to-signal ratio. This figure displays the ratio between the range 
(high-low prices) and the open-to-close returns for the top decile of our network 
intervals. 
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Centralization |Centralization| 
  
Assortativity Clustering 
  
LSCC  
 
Figure 3: Histograms for the network variables. Observations corresponding 
to the 95th percentile of the noise-to-signal ratio are in red; all other observations 
are in green. 
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Table I: Correlations between Financial and Network Variables 
This table contains pairwise correlations calculated from 12,032 networks of 600 
sequential trades in the nearby e-mini S&P 500 futures contract on the CME Globex 
platform during August 2009. Centralization, |centralization|, assortativity, 
clustering and the largest strongly connected component (LSCC) are network 
variables computed as defined in Section I. Returns are open-to-close network returns 
computed as differences between log ending and beginning prices during each 
interval. Volatility is the range between high and low prices, volume is the total 
number of contracts traded and duration is the time (in seconds) elapsed between the 
start and end of the network interval. Effective Spread is equal to twice the square 
root of the first order autocovariance of returns, Stoll (1978), over each interval (x10-
3). Signed Volume is equal to the buy volume minus the sell volume. Trade Imbalance 
is equal to the number of buy trades less the number of sell trades in each interval. 
Herfindahl Trades is the Herfindahl index computed using the number of trades 
traded by each trader over each interval. * indicates statistical significance at the 5 
percent level. 
 Central 
-ization 
|Central-
ization| 
Assorta-
tivity 
Cluster-
ing  LSCC 
Panel A: 
|Centralization| 0.008     
Assortativity 0.001 0.085*    
Clustering -0.001 -0.235* -0.038*   
LSCC -0.002 -0.142* -0.550* 0.541*  
Panel B: 
Returns 0.675* -0.011 0.013 0.011 0.006 
Volatility -0.025* 0.170* -0.072* -0.034* 0.024* 
Volume 0.018 0.093* -0.052* 0.101* 0.153* 
Duration -0.006 -0.193* -0.011 0.003 -0.015 
Effective Spread -0.003 -0.157* 0.033 -0.250* -0.318 
Signed Volume 0.637* 0.007 -0.004 -0.009 -0.004 
Trade Imbalance 0.669* -0.013 0.015 0.013 0.002 
Herfindahl Trades -0.004 -0.027* 0.067* -0.621* -0.559 A
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Table II: Network Variables: p-values for the Null Hypothesis of Granger Non-causality 
The sample contains p-values for the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality for vector autoregressions (VARs) using 
the time series of 12,032 network variables each comprised of 600 sequential trades in the nearby e-mini S&P 500 
futures contract on the CME Globex platform during August 2009. Centralization, |centralization|, assortativity, 
clustering and the largest strongly connected component (LSCC) are network variables computed as defined in Section 
I. The VARs are estimated using generalized method of moments (GMM) with HAC robust standard errors and with 
optimal lag-length of 12 selected using Akaike Information Criterion. The upper right quadrant displays p-values for 
pairwise tests of the first column variable Granger-causing the first row variable, with Total representing the p-value 
for the first column variable jointly Granger-causing all variables in the first row.  The lower left quadrant displays 
p-values for pairwise tests of the first row variable Granger-causing the first column variable, with All representing 
the p-value for the first row variable jointly Granger-causing all variables in the first column. 
 Centralization |Centralization| Assortativity Clustering  LSCC Total 
Centralization  0.59 0.75 0.99 0.65 0.65 
|Centralization| 0.18  0.11 0.01* 0.04* 0.00* 
Assortativity 0.69 0.09  0.03* 0.00* 0.00* 
Clustering 0.54 0.06 0.00*  0.00* 0.00* 
LSCC 0.98 0.15 0.00* 0.06  0.00* 
All 0.37 0.05* 0.00* 0.01* 0.00*  
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Table III: Financial and Network Variables: p-values for the Null 
Hypothesis of Granger Non-causality 
The sample contains p-values for the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality for 
VARs using the time series of 12,032 network variables each comprised of 600 
sequential trades in the nearby e-mini S&P 500 futures contract on the CME Globex 
platform during August 2009. Returns, Volatility, Duration, Volume, Effective 
Spreads, Signed Volume, Trade Imbalance, and Herfindahl Trades are computed over 
each interval. Centralization, Assortativity, Clustering and the Largest Strongly 
Connected Component (LSCC) are network variables computed as defined in Section 
I. The VARs are estimated using GMM with HAC robust standard errors and with 
optimal lag-length of 12 selected using AIC.  Each number represents the p-value for 
pairwise tests between variables in each column, with arrows indicating significance 
at the 5% level. The p-values in parentheses denote that these four Network 
Variables jointly Granger-cause Financial Variables with significance at the 5 
percent level labeled *. The p-values in brackets denote that Financial Variables 
jointly Granger-cause the four Network Variables with significance at the 5 percent 
level labeled †. Centralization is used in the VAR for returns while |centralization| 
is used in the VARs for all other financial variables. 
 
 
  
Panel A: 
   
 
 
 
Returns 
(0.01)* 
[0.00]† 
 
0.00 0.00 Centralization 0.00 0.00 
Volatility 
(0.00)* 
[0.00]† 
0.25 0.05 
               
Assortativity 0.00 0.04 
0.88 0.40 
Clustering 
0.00 0.00 
0.16 0.68 
                           
LSCC 0.05 0.00 
   Panel B:    
 
 
              
Duration 
(0.00)* 
[0.20] 
 
0.00 0.11 Centralization 0.48 0.00 
Volume 
(0.00)* 
[0.16] 
 
0.01 0.34 
               
Assortativity 0.05 0.03 
0.00 0.51 Clustering 0.15 0.00 
0.00 0.01 
                           
LSCC 0.14 0.00 
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   Panel C:    
 
 
 
Signed Volume 
(0.00)* 
[0.35] 
 
0.08 0.10 Centralization 0.84 0.20 
Herfindahl 
Trades 
(0.00)* 
[0.22] 
0.90 0.98 
Assortativity 
0.19 0.01 
0.75 0.68 
Clustering 
0.58 0.00 
0.92 0.80 
LSCC 
0.37 0.00 
   Panel D:    
 
 
Effective 
Spread 
(0.00)* 
[0.21] 
0.00 0.07 Centralization 0.20 0.02 
Trade 
Imbalance 
(0.03)* 
[0.18] 
0.00 0.14 
               
Assortativity 
0.14 0.21 
0.25 0.38 Clustering 0.11 0.66 
0.00 0.42 LSCC 0.44 0.17 
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Table IV: Simulation Results - Correlations between Financial and 
Network Variables 
This table contains pairwise correlations between network variables each calculated 
from 12,000 simulated networks of 600 sequential trades as described in Section IV.  
Centralization, |centralization|, assortativity, clustering and the largest strongly 
connected component (LSCC) are network variables computed as defined in Section 
I. Returns are open-to-close network returns computed as differences between log 
ending and beginning prices during each interval. Volatility is the range between 
high and low prices, volume is the total number of contracts traded and duration is 
the time (in seconds) elapsed between the start and end of the network interval. 
Effective Spread is equal to twice the square root of the first order autocovariance of 
returns, Stoll (1978), over each interval (x10-3). Signed Volume is equal to the buy 
volume minus the sell volume. Imbalance is equal to the number of buy trades less 
the number of sell trades in each interval. The Herfindahl Trades measure is the 
Herfindahl index computed using the number of trades traded by each trader over 
each interval. * indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level. 
 
 Central 
-ization 
|Central-
ization| 
Assorta-
tivity 
Cluster-
ing  LSCC 
Returns 0.605* -0.024* 0.003 -0.000 0.003 
Volatility 0.008 0.219* 0.013 0.004 -0.059* 
Volume -0.004 0.067* 0.119* 0.042* -0.028* 
Duration 0.016 0.003 0.012 -0.002 0.003 
Effective Spread 0.052* 0.039* 0.031* 0.007 -0.010 
Signed Volume 0.299* 0.009 0.043* 0.021* -0.016 
Imbalance 0.722* 0.052* -0.011 0.000 -0.022* 
Herf. Trades -0.001 -0.138* 0.001 -0.050* -0.818* 
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Table V: T-tests for Differences in Means by Noise-to-Signal Ratio 
Mean (0) and Std. Dev. (0) refer to the means and standard deviations of the 
network statistics calculated from the network intervals not belonging to the largest 
quintile of the noise-to-signal ratio. Mean (1) and Std. Dev. (1) refer to means and 
standard deviations of the network statistics calculated from the network intervals 
within the largest quintile of the noise-to-signal ratio. t-tests relate to the 
differences between means.  
 
 Centralization |Centralization| Assortativity Clustering LSCC 
Mean (0) 0.0000 0.0012 -0.0020 0.0010 0.0101 
Std. 
Dev. (0) 
0.1591 0.1025 0.0389 0.0279 0.1592 
      
Mean (1) 0.0116 -0.0372 0.0056 0.0057 0.0117 
Std. 
Dev. (1) 
0.1331 0.0733 0.0441 0.0319 0.1331 
      
t-test 0.041 -0.218 0.070 0.099 0.024 
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Table VI: Testing the Li and Schürhoff (2014) Mark-up Hypothesis 
This table presents results from the regression: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗
3
𝑗=0
𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾0 + ℎ0 + 𝑚0 + 𝑠0 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝑘𝑡 is a centrality measure for the top seven traders, by net volume, 𝑟𝑖, is the 
return over the network measurement interval and 𝛾0, ℎ0, 𝑚0, 𝑠0 are the day of the 
week, hour, minute, second fixed effects. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 
5 and 1 percent level. The mark-up hypothesis implies that 𝛽1 < 0, 𝛽2 > 0and 𝛽3 > 0. 
 Dependent variable 
Independent Variable rt kt 
kt -0.0002***  
 (0.00001)  
kt-1 0.00003***  
 (0.00001)  
kt-2 0.00002**  
 (0.00001)  
kt-3 0.00001  
 (0.00001)  
rt-1  77.882*** 
  (8.195) 
rt-2  52.083*** 
  (8.199) 
rt-3  24.678*** 
  (8.208) 
Observations 12,043 12,043 
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.011 
F Statistic 3.968*** (df = 133; 11909) 1.975*** (df = 132; 11910) 
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Appendix A—Re-wired and Simulation Results 
 
We start the simulation by endowing a fixed number of traders with orders 
which arrive with a Poisson distributed inter-arrival time and are assigned at 
random. The quantity for each order is drawn from a lognormal distribution and with 
an equal probability of being a buy or a sell order. For a sell (buy) order the price is 
set a small fixed number above (below) the last transaction price plus a log-normally 
distributed, mean zero random variable. The (log-normally distributed, zero mean) 
random variable added to the order price is consistent with an equilibrium price 
function under the assumption of heterogeneous beliefs about the true price process 
(see Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)). 
As our simulation starts, orders begin to populate the limit order book. Each 
incoming order is compared to previously placed orders by price and time priority. If 
a match between a buy and sell order is made, a transaction takes place. If an order 
is only partially filled, we attempt to match the remaining quantity against other 
orders on the book, and if no match is found, the order remains in the limit order 
book. In order to avoid stale limit orders, each order expires and is withdrawn from 
the market after 100 subsequent transactions are executed. 
We simulate orders until we attain 7.2 million transactions, segment the data 
into 12,000 networks of 600 consecutive transactions, and compute simulated 
network and financial variables for each sampling interval using the same methods 
applied to the empirically observed data. We then analyze both correlations and 
lead/lag relations among these variables to compare with actual market results. 
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Appendix B—Summary Statistics and Additional Results 
 
Table A-I: Network Variables: Summary Statistics 
The sample contains summary statistics for 12,032 networks each comprised of 600 
sequential trades in the nearby e-mini S&P 500 futures contract on the CME Globex 
platform during August 2009. Centralization, |centralization|, assortativity, 
clustering and the largest strongly connected component (LSCC) are network 
variables computed as defined in Section I. ADF probability refers to the p-value of 
the ADF test for the null of unit root. Terms in [brackets] below autocorrelation 
coefficients refer to p-values of the Portmanteau Q-test for no serial correlation at 1, 
5, and 10 lags. 
 Centralization |Centralization| Assortativity Clustering  LSCC 
Mean 0.0022 0.1373 0.0424 0.0524 0.0912 
Median 0.0037 0.1177 0.0321 0.0483 0.0857 
Maximum 0.6499 0.7356 0.3385 0.2250 0.5217 
Minimum -0.7356 0.0000 -0.0557 0.0004 0.0024 
Std. Dev. 0.1711 0.1021 0.0391 0.0282 0.0641 
Skewness -0.0200 0.9944 1.5562 0.9605 0.7500 
Kurtosis 2.9827 4.0422 6.2788 4.4588 3.6643 
ADF probability 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Autocorrelations: 
Lag 1 
0.007 
[0.462] 
0.003 
[0.779] 
0.120 
[0.000] 
0.197 
[0.000] 
0.273 
[0.000] 
 
Lag 5 
0.079 
[0.000] 
0.013 
[0.000] 
0.074 
[0.000] 
0.085 
[0.000] 
0.132 
[0.000] 
 
Lag 10 
0.060 
[0.000] 
0.029 
[0.000] 
0.058 
[0.000] 
0.055 
[0.000] 
0.078 
[0.000] 
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Table A-II: Financial Variables: Summary Statistics 
The sample contains summary statistics for 12,032 networks each comprised of 600 sequential trades in the nearby e-mini S&P 
500 futures contract on the CME Globex platform during August 2009. Returns are open-to-close network returns computed as 
differences between log ending and beginning prices during each interval. Volatility is the range between high and low prices, 
volume is the total number of contracts traded and duration is the time (in seconds) elapsed between the start and end of the 
network interval. Effective Spread is equal to twice the square root of the first order autocovariance of returns, Stoll (1978), over 
each interval (x10-3). Signed Volume is equal to the buy volume minus the sell volume. When the price is constant (zero returns), 
buy/sell volume is equal to that of the previous interval. Trade Imbalance is equal to the number of buy trades less the number 
of sell trades in each interval. Herfindahl Trades is the Herfindahl index computed using the number of trades traded by each 
trader over each interval (x10-3). ADF probability refers to the p-value of the ADF test for the null of unit root. Terms in [brackets] 
below autocorrelation coefficients refer to p-values of the Portmanteau Q-test for no serial correlation at 1, 5, and 10 lags.  
  Returns Volatility Volume Duration 
Effective 
Spread 
Signed  
Volume 
Trade 
Imbalance 
Herfindahl 
Trades 
Mean 0.0002 0.0621 2628.7 40.775 7.9369 13.804 0.0145 0.0842 
Median 0.0000 0.0507 2521.0 28.000 7.9046 18.000 0.0000 0.0836 
Maximum 0.1992 0.2901 7706.0 344.00 21.256 5171.0 13.000 0.1306 
Minimum -0.1493 0.0241 1095.0 0.0000 0.0011 -4592.0 -8.0000 0.0242 
Std. Dev 0.0383 0.0191 636.06 37.926 2.1513 1219.3 1.5679 0.0126 
Skewness -0.0116 0.9046 1.9566 1.9630 0.1778 0.0462 0.0615 0.1456 
Kurtosis 2.7977 7.0270 11.016 8.1385 3.7118 2.9539 3.5352 3.1088 
ADF probability 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
Autocorrelations: 
Lag 1 
-0.0121 
[0.185] 
0.1747 
[0.000] 
0.5211 
[0.000] 
0.5483 
[0.000] 
0.1867 
[0.000] 
0.1985 
[0.000] 
-0.0113 
[0.213] 
0.3796 
[0.000] 
Lag 5 -0.0136 
[0.363] 
0.1392 
[0.000] 
0.3378 
[0.000] 
0.3805 
[0.000] 
0.1263 
[0.000] 
0.0364 
[0.000] 
-0.0080 
[0.073] 
0.1840 
[0.000] 
Lag 10 0.0027 
[0.289] 
0.1076 
[0.000] 
0.2351 
[0.000] 
0.3299 
[0.000] 
0.0992 
[0.000] 
0.0064 
[0.000] 
0.0054 
[0.115] 
0.1249 
[0.000] 
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Table A-III: Financial and Liquidity Measures: p-values for the Null 
Hypothesis of Granger Non-causality 
The sample contains p-values for the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality for bi-
variate VARs estimated with optimal lag-length 6 selected using the AIC over 12,032 
sequential networks each comprised of 600 sequential trades in the nearby e-mini 
S&P 500 futures contract on the CME Globex platform during August 2009. Each 
number represents the p-value for pairwise tests between variables in each column, 
with arrows indicating significance at the 5% level. Returns are open-to-close network 
returns computed as differences between log ending and beginning prices during each 
interval. Volatility is the range between high and low prices, Volume is the total 
number of contracts traded and Duration is the time (in seconds) elapsed between the 
start and end of the network interval. Effective Spread is equal to twice the square 
root of the first order autocovariance of returns, Stoll (1978), over each interval (x10-
3). Signed Volume is equal to the buy volume minus the sell volume. Trade Imbalance 
is equal to the number of buy trades less the number of sell trades in each interval. 
Herfindahl Trades is the Herfindahl index computed using the number of trades 
traded by each trader over each interval.  
 
   Panel A:    
                             
                   
          
 Signed  
Volume 
0.18 0.10 Returns 0.55 0.81 
Herfindahl 
Trades 
0.47 0.91 
            
Volatility 0.00 0.71 
0.48 0.02 
 
Volume 0.00 0.01 
0.02 0.37 
             
Duration 
0.00 0.00 
   Panel B:    
               
            
              
Effective 
 Spread 
0.72 0.52 Returns 0.15 0.24 
Trade 
Imbalance 
0.05 0.00 Volatility 0.60 0.93 
0.00 0.00 Volume 0.29 0.10 
0.00 0.00 Duration 0.13 0.07 
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